Обратный эффект санкций. Как санкции меняют мир не в интересах США - Агата Демаре

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Технологический пузырь, пузырь интернет-компаний, или пузырь доткомов (англ. dotcom, от названия доменов верхнего уровня. com, англ. dot — «точка») — завышение цены акций высокотехнологичных компаний во второй половине 1990-х годов. Кульминация стоимости и обвальное падение индекса этих компаний пришлись на март 2000 года. (Прим. пер.)

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